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SYMPOSIUM
CIVILIAN CONTROL: NEW PERSPECTIVES FOR
NEW PROBLEMS
ADAM YARMOLINSKYt
Civilian control of the military establishment seems so basic and
generally accepted a principle as scarcely to be worth discussing. And
yet we are surrounded by distressing evidence that civilian control of to-
day's booming military establishment is a good deal less than a generally
prevailing reality.
To take examples only from this decade: the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff conducts an espionage operation, including the purloining
of secret documents not intended for his eyes, from the offices of the As-
sistant to the President for National Security. An Air Force Major
General conducts a private war in Vietnam, apparently unsanctioned by
his superiors, military or civilian. Cost overruns on the full-scale de-
velopment of forty-five weapons systems have amounted to $31 billion.'
And the Pentagon public information and legislative liaison services show
no signs of diminishing the size or intensity of their efforts, despite
mounting criticism from the outside world.
It is tempting to attribute these out-of-control episodes to the ex-
cesses of the power-hungry military. But there is no reason to believe
that American military men are more power-hungry than their counter-
parts in civilian bureaucracies, in or out of government. There are con-
flicting strains in the training and indoctrination of the career military,
so that military men are anxious to receive policy guidance from their
civilian "masters," at the same time they seek to protect their professional
autonomy-an endeavor which may, in their view, include making judg-
ments about how much is necessary, in men, weapons and dollars, to
protect the national security.'
t Ralph Waldo Emerson University Professor, University of Massachusetts.
1. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COM-
miTTEE, March 26, 1973 (B163058).
2. Robert Kennedy recalled his conversation with the President on this subject:
During the Cuban missile crisis President Kennedy was disturbed by the in-
ability of the military to look beyond the limited military field. . . . [H]e said
we had to remember that they were trained to fight and wage war-that was
their life. Perhaps we would feel even more concerned if they were always op-
posed to using arms or military means-for if they would not be willing, who
would be? But this experience pointed out for us all the importance of civilian
direction and control and the importance of raising probing questions to mili-
tary recommendations.
R. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS 119 (1969).
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The fact is that the apparatus of civilian control that was developed
to implement the original concept of the founding fathers has proved
wholly inadequate to control an establishment several orders of magni-
tude larger and more complex. The problem is not the overweening
military, but the inadequate civilians, who, lacking the means, cannot
even test their determination to exercise effective control. The danger
in this situation is not that the military may take aver the country, but
that the country is not able to preside over the military.
This is not to suggest that civilians know better than military pro-
fessionals how to establish a beachhead, or how to design a weapons
system. It is to assert that, as an earlier generation discovered that war
was too important to be left to the generals, so the current generation has
found that planning a military force designed primarily to deter war is
also too important to leave entirely to the generals.'
I
Concern about civilian control of the military has been a continuing,
if minor, theme in American political history, beginning with the debates
in the Constitutional Convention.' But by and large this concern, as ex-
pressed in constitutional and statutory provisions, has been addressed to
the supposed danger of the military assuming civilian authority, rather
than the danger of civilian authority losing effective control of the mili-
tary qua military. In The Federalist Papers, the thrust of Hamilton's
argument goes to the need for a standing army in peacetime, and the
absence of any internal threat from such a force, given the protection
provided in the Constitution.5
The three constitutional checks on the power of the military-the
power reserved to the Congress to declare war,6 the two-year limitation
on Army appropriations, 7 and the specification of a civilian Commander
in Chief-were all taken quite seriously by the founding fathers.9 In
fact, they have proved largely irrelevant to the central dilemmas of civilian
control in the second half of the twentieth century.
The allocation of the war power to the Congress has been a subject
of controversy between the legislative and executive branches, not be-
3. "War is much too serious a matter to be entrusted to generals." G. Clemenceau,
quoted in THE GREAT QUOTATIONS 162 (G. Seldes ed. 1960).
4. See, e.g., 2 REcoms OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 1787, at 334, 341 (M. Farrand
ed. 1937).
5. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 23-28 (A. Hamilton).
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 11.
7. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
8. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
9. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 23-29 (A. Hamilton).
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tween the civil and the military arms-and even here it has not prevented
the Executive from conducting two full-scale wars, in Korea and in Indo-
china. The last congressional declaration of war was in 1941.10 The
two-year limitation on appropriations" has not prevented the Pentagon
from making long-range commitments for the development of weapons
systems, which the Congress finds difficult if not impossible to repudi-
ate. Further, the Attorney General has determined that a congressional
appropriation of so-called "no-year" funds-funds that need not be ex-
pended in the fiscal year for which they are appropriated-is not a viola-
tion of the two-year limit.'2
Lastly, the powers of the President as Commander in Chief, vis-A-
vis the military establishment, have never been tested in the courts, 3 and
the bare constitutional declaration has not perceptibly strengthened his
hand, nor helped him to resolve the specific problems of control that will
be discussed in detail below.
The Congress has been scrupulous to supplement with statutory
language the purpose of the constitutional provisions, but it has done so
in areas that again have relatively little bearing on the major issues.
Congressional actions here look suspiciously like an elaborate effort to
lock the barn door without looking to see whether the horses are there
or not. In the National Security Act of 1947, which first created a (rela-
tively) unified Department of Defense, the Congress specified that the
Act was not intended "to establish a single Chief of Staff over the armed
forces nor an overall armed forces general staff."14  The Joint Chiefs of
Staff, created as a body in the 1947 Act, were not supplied with a Chair-
man until the 1949 Amendments, which were careful to provide: "While
holding office, the Chairman outranks all other officers of the armed
forces. However, he may not exercise military command over the Joint
Chiefs of Staff or any of the armed forces."'" In addition, the size of the
Joint Staff has been severely limited by statute, and members of the Joint
Staff are prohibited from serving as such for more than three years, and
from being reassigned to the Joint Staff after less than a three-year in-
terval.'"
10. Act of Dec. 11, 1941, 55 Stat. 1942.
11. The limitation, of course, applies to the Army but not to the Navy; consider its
applicability to the Air Force.
12. 40 Op. ATr'y GEN. 555 (1948).
13. Cy., Holtzman v. Richardson, 361 F. Supp. 544, injunction stayed sub norn.
Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 361 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 483 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, - U.S. - (1974).
14. 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1970).
15. 10 U.S.C. § 142(c) (1970).
16. 10 U.S.C. § 143(a) (1970).
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But these highly specific provisions were not designed to protect the
civilian authorities from the pressures of centralized military authority.
Rather, they were carefully worked out to protect the autonomy of the
separate military services from centralized (military) control. It is per-
haps more significant that the Congress specifically provided that "[t]he
Joint Staff shall not operate or be organized as an overall Armed Forces
General Staff and shall have no executive authority."" Further, it was
provided that the individual members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (whQ
are also the military chiefs of their respective services) are free to present
their views to the Congress even without being requested to do so-a pro-
vision that has been described as "legislated insubordination."'"
In another area, the Congress has been even more explicit. In re-
stricting the authority of the Director or the Deputy Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, it has provided that one, but not both, of
these two positions may "be occupied simultaneously by commissioned
officers of the armed services, whether in an active or retired status."'"
Section 102 of the National Security Act provides that if a commis-
sioned officer is appointed to one of these posts,
he shall be subject to no supervision, control, restriction, or pro-
hibition (military or otherwise) other than would be operative
with respect to him if he were a civilian in no way connected
with the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
the Department of the Air Force, or the armed services or any
component thereof .... "
But these minutely specific provisions"' do not affect the representation
of the military departments on the United States Intelligence Board, which
formulates the official positions of the intelligence community.
Thus we can see that constitutional and statutory restrictions on
military power have been addressed to the specter of the man on a white
horse, rather than the need for civilian authority to set the guidelines by
17. 10 U.S.C. § 143(d) (1970).
18. 10 U.S.C. § 141(e) (1970).
19. 50 U.S.C. § 403(a) (1970).
20. 50 U.S.C. § 403(b) (1) (A) (1970).
21. The Congress provided additional restrictions by specifying that a military
officer in the Director or Deputy Director post
shall not possess or exercise any supervision, control, powers, or functions (other
than . . .as Director, or Deputy Director) with respect to the armed services
or any component thereof, the Department of the Army, the Department of the
Navy, or the Department of the Air Force, or any branch, bureau, unit, or divi-
sion thereof, or with respect to any of the personnel (military or civilian) of
any of the foregoing.
50 U.S.C. § 403(b) (1) (B) (1970).
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which the military conducts its own business-now the largest business
in the United States. In fact the military establishment has recently
been surpassed by the health care industry as taking the largest share of
the Gross National Product, but the military budget, including transfer
payments as well as expenditures for goods and services, is still the larg-
est budget in the federal system. The military reached its present size
(apart from the two World Wars) only with the Korean War, when the
combination of real need to combat the growing power of the Soviet
Union, and panicky overreaction to the fact that the United States was
no longer protected militarily by two oceans, served to prevent the major
reduction of military strength that normally followed a war. Somewhere
in the fifties, the forces working for expansion of the military establish-
ment overbalanced the forces that had traditionally returned military
strength to peacetime size. The figures appear in Table 1.
II
Before turning to the question of new means to achieve civilian con-
trol of the military establishment itself, we need to consider, at least
briefly, the question of the adequacy of civilian will and determination.
That will and determination are significantly limited by what has been
described as the military-industrial complex-and might more accurately
be described as the military-industrial-labor-congressional complex. The
phenomenon of the military-industrial complex is well known.2 The co-
incidence of interest, among military men, defense contractors, labor
unions and politicians, not to mention bankers, lawyers and public rela-
tions types, is so clear that no conspiracy theory is required to predict its
coxisequences in encouraging expansion of the military establishment and
restraining criticism of defense spending.2" What is less obvious is that
the military-industrial complex is only a special case of a generalized
phenomenon in modern industrial society that includes, for example, the
22. See President Eisenhower's Farewell Address, January 17, 1961:
This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms in-
dustry is new in the American experience. The total influence-economic, politi-
cal, even spiritual-is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Fed-
eral government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we
must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and live-
lihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.
PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,
1960-61, % 421 at 1035, 1038 (1961).
23. In testimony before the Joint Economic Committee, Secretary of Defense
Schlesinger maintained that although all of the defense budget can be justified on the
grounds of military requirements, a portion of the budget would not have been submitted
to Congress if it were not for the downswing in the economy. Hearings on the Nationual
Budget for the Fiscal Year 1975 Before the Joint Economic Comm., 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974) (unpublished as of September 1974).
658
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TABLE 1
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES FY 1946-1975
Actual Dollar In Constant
Expenditures 1958 Dollars As % of
FY (billions) (billions) G.N.P.
1946 39.0 58.5 19.4
1947 9.5 12.7 4.3
1948 9.6 12.1 4.0
1949 12.4 15.6 4.8
1950 12.7 15.8 4.8
1951 22.7 26.5 7.0
1952 41.8 47.8 12.4
1953 48.8 55.2 13.6
1954 45.6 50.9 12.6
1955 38.7 42.6 10.2
1956 39.1 41.6 9.6
1957 42.5 43.6 9.9
1958 44.8 44.8 10.2
1959 46.4 45.6 9.9
1960 44.9 43.5 9.1
1961 46.7 44.3 9.2
1962 50.5 48.0 9.3
1963 50.4 47.3 8.8
1964 50.8 46.2 8.3
1965 48.9 42.9 7.5
1966 54.4 46.3 7.5
1967 67.7 56.3 8.8
1968 75.9 61.3 9.2
1969 78.0 60.1 8.7
1970 77.0 54.0 8.1
1971 73.2 46.7 7.2
1972 73.9 44.7 6.8
1973 73.9 41.3 6.1
1974 75.3 38.7 5.6
1975 82.0 38.9 5.6
Source: DOD Directorate for Information Operation
OASD Comptroller
Actual dollar figures deflated by Implicit Price Deflator,
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis
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highway-industrial complex, or the educational-industrial complex."4 The
major differences between the military-industrial complex and all the
other such relationships are first that it is bigger by at least an order of
magnitude, and likely, for the foreseeable future, to remain uniquely so.
No practical proposals have been advanced for cutting the defense budget
by more than, say, twenty-five percent.
The second major difference is that decisions based on the special
interests of the complex can have a profound (and sometimes dangerous)
impact on the national security. Spending an additional, and unnecessary,
increment of funds on the military establishment may not only be waste-
ful; it may also destabilize the nuclear balance, set off an arms race, or
create troublesome international political problems.
Because the military-industrial complex is uniquely large, its ex-
istence tends to sap the will and determination of the politicians in the
legislative branch, and of the President himself, who must also be a poli-
tician. The political pressures generated by the far-flung constituencies
of the military establishment are increased by the politician's reasonable
fear that if he is responsible for denying a military request, and the na-
tional security is then impaired-or believed to be impaired-he will be
blamed.
The pressures resulting from economic considerations are likely to
bear more heavily on the legislative branch, because the economic issues
are likely to be local ones, and because members of the legislative branch
are generally more responsive than the executive branch to local pressures.
On the other hand, pressures resulting from concerns about national
security are likely to weigh more heavily on the President, since he is the
single individual ultimately responsible. This distinction is reinforced
by the fact that the Congress exerts its control over the military primarily
by refusing to appropriate money, while the Executive may take sub-
stantive initiatives in changing the force structure and strategy.25 In
fact, the Congress is even reluctant to make specific budget cuts because
of the extraordinary amount of technical detail involved; Congressmen
prefer to make overall budget adjustments, or to introduce procedural
24. For a more detailed discussion of the military complex, see A. YARmOLINSxY,
THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT 38-68 (1971) [hereinafter cited as MILITARY ESTABLISH-
MENT].
25. The Indochina War provisions are an exception. See Act of Dec. 17, 1973, 87
Stat. 714 (The Foreign Assistance Act). Similar prohibitions on the use of funds are
contained in the Act of July 1, 1973, 87 Stat. 99 (The Second Supplemental Appropria-
tions Act) ; Act of July 1, 1973, 87 Stat. 130 (The Continuing Appropriations Resolu-
tion); Act of Oct. 18, 1973, 87 Stat. 451 (The Department of State Appropriations
Authorization Act) ; and Act of Nov. 16, 1973, 87 Stat. 605 (Department of Defense
Appropriation Authorization Act).
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requirements instead.2" Congressional alliances with the military hier-
archy are a well-known fact of life, particularly those between senior
members of the relevant congressional committees and senior military
officers. On the other hand, the Congress is probably less reluctant than
the executive branch to confront the military directly on a broad issue,
since the Congress does not operate under quite the same constraints of
having to govern the military establishment with and through the mili-
tary itself.
As the will to exercise civilian control is a variable quantity, so the
nature of the control that is appropriate and feasible, even under ideal
circumstances, also varies considerably with the subject matter.
III
Whatever civilian control has meant over the past two hundred
years, it can mean a number of quite different things today. Its scope
extends from control of research and development decisions affecting fu-
ture weapons systems to control of actual military operations. The de-
gree of civilian control varies widely across this broad spectrum of ac-
tivities. Part of this variation is attributable to the appropriateness of
varying degrees of civilian control, and part of it is due to the relative
effectiveness of the control that is actually exercised. Actions of field
commanders cannot be controlled as closely as actions of desk-bound
officers; but rules of engagement, which may be critical to the political
conduct of a war, can be more or less effective depending on how they
are drafted and how consistent they are with overall foreign policy ob-
jectives.
Civilian control also has different meanings in different contexts.
It can mean control over aberrations from established policy, or deter-
mination of new policy directions. It can mean a general curb on the
expansionist tendencies of some military activities, or it can mean a
strengthening of some military activities, undervalued by the military
itself, partially or wholly at the expense of others. And, as indicated
above, it can be exercised primarily by the Congress, by the White House
(and its appendages, the National Security Council Staff and the Office
of Management and Budget), or by civilians within the Department itself.
The simplest-if not the easiest-way to increase civilian control
across the entire spectrum of military activity would be to reduce the size
of the military establishment. But a reduction of twenty, thirty, or even
26. L. Aspin, Improving Congressional Oversight of Military Policies, Budgets,
Decision-Making, (paper presented at Aspen (Colorado) Arms Control Conference)
Summer 1973 [hereinafter cited as Aspin].
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forty percent in the military budget, beyond anything that has been pro-
posed in recent budgetary debates, would still leave an institution uniquely
large and complex. Further, the processes of cutting back the budget
and force structure-although in the view of this writer highly desirable
-tend to freeze attitudes and to heighten intra-institutional jealousies.
The reforms of the early sixties were made easier because they were car-
ried out in the context of an expanding overall defense budget.
Since the simple way is not open, it is necessary to break down the
problem into its component parts, and to look at ways to increase civilian
control in five areas: overall budgeting, research and development, force
structure, contingency planning, and actual military operations. This
catalog is arranged in ascending order of difficulty, the order in which
we shall address it. If this is a novel way of approaching the problem of
civilian control, it is dictated by the size and shape of the problem today.
IV
Civilian control of the overall military budget has involved close
scrutiny of detail by the civilian authorities in the Pentagon, and resolute
avoidance of detail by the civilian authorities in the White House. The
Kennedy administration used to take pride in the budgetary instructions
from the President to his Secretary of Defense to determine the budget
necessary to protect the security of the United States, without regard to
arbitrary or predetermined budget ceilings. No one asked at the time
whether similar instructions had been given to the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare, or to the Administrator of the Housing and
Home Finance Agency--or, if they had, how the government would have
been able to construct a manageable budget. In fact, President Kennedy
was saved from the consequences of -his instruction only by the extra-
ordinary ability of his Secretary of Defense to focus on questions of de-
tails as they arose in literally hundreds of "subject issue papers" during
budget season. And even then there had to be some tacit understanding
between the Secretary and the President that the budget would be more
(or rather less) than the sum of its parts. Somewhere in their discus-
sions about specific budget issues, an overall budget ceiling emerged.
The overall size of the peacetime budget is as much a response to the
pressure exerted on the total federal budget by ;ionmilitary spenders as it is
a function of the military needs of the country. Because the decision is so
quintessentially political-a matter of choice, in which the components
cannot possibly be quantified, and the pressures must be balanced largely
by intuition--civilian control is less difficult to achieve here than in any
other area. Most military pressures for specific weapons systems can be
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accommodated within almost any given budget ceiling by making appro-
priate adjustments elsewhere in the budget.
The Budgetary Process
To understand the issue better it may be useful to look at the process
by which the budget ceiling is developed. Before the advent of the
McNamara budgeting reforms in 1961, the allocation of the military bud-
get was largely determined by bargaining among and within the military
departments, after an overall ceiling had been fixed by the President with
the advice of the Secretary of the Treasury. McNamara introduced
three major reforms: organization of the budget by functional cate-
gories (e.g., strategic nuclear forces, general purpose forces, reserves, re-
search and development, etc.) which cut across service lines; multi-year
programming, which projected the total costs of forces and weapons sys-
tems, including systems still in a development phase, at least five years
ahead; and intensive review and examination of budget submissions from
the military departments by civilian staff in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, which addressed questions of the military justification for par-
ticular weapons systems or system characteristics, as well as traditionally
"civilian" questions of cost and technical feasibility.
Since the McNamara system did not involve any predetermined bud-
get ceilings, however, it tended ta result either in increased overall budgets
or in major eleventh-hour cuts, as the Secretary and his staff reviewed
the final total program costs for budget purposes. The changes in the
system introduced by Secretary Laird provided for initial dollar targets
for the military departments, based on very preliminary and general plan-
ning documents (sometimes characterized as "wish lists") submitted by
the military, so that the final budget decision by the Secretary was not a
total shock to the military departments and their bureaucracies. These
preliminary budgetary determinations also came to involve review by an
interdepartmental group, including the Secretary of State and the As-
sistant to the President for National Security Affairs. At the same time,
Laird reduced the role of his civilian staff in proposing program direc-
tions, and left the initiative more to the uniformed planning staffs in the
military departments.
Given this sequence of decisionmaking, the major substantive issues
in the budget-whether or not to build another nuclear carrier, whether
or not to add (or subtract) an Army division or a Marine Corps brigade,
whether or not to proceed with MIRVing the Minuteman missiles-are
settled privately between the Pentagon and the White House, although
there may be some judicious leaking to the press by both sides while the
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discussion is going on. The President will then fix the overall size of
the military budget. He will undoubtedly be influenced in his ultimate
judgment by the decisions arrived at previously on specific issues. If, for
example, he had agreed to buy a new carrier, he cannot preserve a level
budget (even in constant dollars) unless he insists on a cutback in some
other part of the force structure. But the decision is his, in the last analy-
sis. Even if the Congress tries to add a major Pentagon proposal re-
jected by the White House, it is unlikely to succeed. Defense legislation
is not like a Rivers and Harbors bill. And the White House is on stronger
ground in refusing to spend money actually appropriated for defense
than it is when domestic appropriations are at issue.
Congressional Option~s
The public issue is likely to be the amount of overall increase or re-
duction from the previous year's budget. Whether the Administration's
proposals amount to an increase or not may, however, be a controversial
question. When the FY 1975 budget request for the Department of De-
fense was sent up to, the Hill, it was accompanied by an FY 1974 supple-
mental budget request for $6.2 billion. The supplemental included $3.4
billion for pay increases authorized by Congress after the original 1974
budget was adopted, and $2.8 billion to cover fuel price increases and
extra costs incurred in supplying equipment to Israel during the Middle
East War. But it also included $2.1 billion essentially to augment in-
ventories and to buy new weapons and equipment. Absent an emergency,
this kind of request is not normally included in a supplemental; when it
is, it has the effect of increasing the current year's budget and reducing the
succeeding year's budget, thus reducing the politically critical (apparent)
budget differential, if the succeeding year's request is higher than the
request for the current year-as it is at this writing."
If, on the other hand, the civilian authorities wish to propose a sub-
stantial decrease, there is no simple device to minimize its political impact,
and it may present serious political problems to the President, and to the
Congress. The Congress is probably in a better position to make across-the-
board cuts in the budget than to quarrel with the massive expertise of the
27. The 1974 Joint Economic Committee Report points out that the concept of
baseline costs is also subject to distortion, as in the case of emergency aid to Israel. The
Administration had requested and Congress had approved $2.2 billion for emergency aid
to Israel. These funds are a proper part of the 1974 defense budget total. In the budget
submitted to Congress, these costs were added to the baseline. They do not belong in
the 1974 defense baseline because they do not represent an enhancement of our military
force structure. Adding emergency aid to Israel in the baseline exaggerates the cost of
United States military forces last year and biases the comparison of the 1974 and 1975
baselines. H.R. REP. No. 927, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 61-63 (1974).
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military on specific cuts. Also an across-the-board cut cannot be identified
as affecting the constituents of a particular Congressman or Senator, while
a specific cut can be traced to the particular defense contracts and subcon-
tracts it will affect.2" But the knowledge that even an across-the-board cut
may have a significant impact on the economy of his district or state can-
not help but have some deterrent effect on a legislator, and makes it more
difficult for the Congress than for the President to take the budget-cutting
initiative.
V
In order to maintain effective civilian control over the military bud-
get as a whole, therefore, without losing control of its basic components,
the civilian authorities must involve themselves deeply in the second and
third issues: control of research and development, and control of force
structure. The principal difficulty they encounter is in mastering the
technical complexities that go into a choice among differing weapons
systems, or a decision as to the need for a new version of an existing
system. The basic problem of expertise is exacerbated by the following
five factors:
1. The decisionmaking process for new weapons systems is almost
insidiously gradual. A new concept is explored because it looks promis-
".g, because it costs relatively little to explore, because it is thought to be
important not to fall behind in the research and development race, even
because exploring new ideas is a necessary activity in order to hold to-
gether a first-rate research and development team. When the new idea
turns out to be promising, it is only natural to put a little more money
into it, and then a -little more. Turning back on the road to full weapons
development becomes more and more difficult as the investment in the
idea grows. Many ideas are abandoned at various stages because they
become impractical, although even as impractical an idea as the nuclear-
powered airplane was pursued for years before the decision to drop it was
made. But to abandon an extremely promising new weapons system,
only because it is not really needed-or because its job can be done more
cheaply-is the most difficult decision of all.
2. Neither the Secretary of Defense, nor the President, nor the
Congress, separately, nor all of them together, can marshal the staff of
experts to match the staffs of the military departments, even if those staffs
were reduced to the absolute minimum necessary to carry on enough re-
search and development to keep up with our major foreign antagonists.
28. See Aspin, supra note 26, part III.
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3. At least some of the essential facts necessary to exercise judg-
ment about research and development alternatives are classified, and while
civilians can and do penetrate the veil of secrecy when they can establish
a "need to know," the very circumstance that they must establish such a
need makes it difficult to ascertain in advance what information may be
missing. How does the civilian decisionmaker or his staff person learn
what it is that he needs to know in order to make the decision?
4. In addition to the impact of the classification process properly
employed, there is the inevitable use of the classification system to hide
adverse facts that the proponents of a particular weapons system would
prefer not to disclose. Curbing the abuse of the system is extraordinarily
difficult, and even major reforms are unlikely to avoid the kind of abuse
involved here. There is no automatic way in which a military research
and development staff can effectively be required to disclose, even to
properly authorized outsiders, all their fears and concerns about a par-
ticular development.
5. Lastly, there is an understandable reluctance on the part of
civilian outsiders to make adverse judgments on complex issues of mili-
tary research and development when a wrong decision against a weapons
system could, just possibly, mean defeat for the United States in a future
conflict, while a wrong favorable decision would only mean unnecessary
dollars for defense. That a favorable decision might launch a new and
destabilizing arms race, or that those dollars might be spent for a more
needed military purpose, within an overall ceiling, are logical arguments,
but not emotionally persuasive ones under the circumstances.
The more troublesome subject-matter area for civilian control of
weapons development is the nonnuclear one, despite the fact that the most
publicized debates concern the choice of nuclear weapons: ABM's,
MIRV's, a new strategic bomber, a new generation of nuclear attack
submarines. Nuclear weapons development options are fairly clearly
identified with specific strategic policies: ABM's go with emphasis on
damage limitation; MIRV's are associated with counterforce. The issues
are complicated enough here. And the military can usually be expected
to advocate new and more complex systems (unless the system is caught
in the crossfire of interservice rivalry).9 But the strategic policy decisions
29. The first of these inter-service battles developed in 1949 when the Air Force
sought approval of the B-36 jet bomber as the centerpiece for the nation's emerging
"deterrence" strategy. The $15 billion defense budget could not allow both the B-36 and
the fleet of new "supercarriers" sought by the Navy as a supplementary means of getting
nuclear bombers to distant foreign targets. The Air Force got its B-36 but the Navy's
supercarriers were denied. MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, supra note 24, at 194. See also
E. KOLODZIEJ, THE UNcommoN DEFENSE AND CONGRESS 109-11 (1966).
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are ultimately made by civilians, and the weapons development decisions
follow.
On the nonnuclear side, however, the characteristics of the new main
battle tank, or the loiter time for a new strike aircraft, are not as clearly
identified with particular strategies, and the military pressure to develop
weapons to meet all possible requirements is greater. The extraordinary
difficulties experienced with the F-111, originally designed to be the first
two-service aircraft, were probably not in the basic civilian-inspired con-
cept, but in the conflicting requirements imposed by the two services,
which were never really translated into alternative strategies and evaluated
by civilian authorities."0
Perhaps the best preparation for a civilian manager who must deal
with decisions about developing new weapons systems is an intensive
course in the classical schoolboy art of precis writing. He must be able
to break through enormous technological complexities to the basic issue
of military usefulness, and he must be able to translate the most elaborate
cost-benefit analysis into layman's terms. If he fails, his superiors in the
Pentagon and the White House will either have to spend more for defense
than is reasonable in the light of other national needs, or they will have
to buy a force that is overequipped in some ways, but inadequate in other
ways-most likely in sheer numbers-to meet national defense require-
ments.
VI
Even more difficult for civilians to cope with are issues of force
structure-particularly nonnuclear force structure. Again, the question
of the mix of manned strategic bombers and land-based and sea-based
nuclear missiles is relatively uncomplicated, as compared with the ques-
tion of what kind of divisional structure is appropriate to the kinds of
nonnuclear conflict in which the United States might become involved, or
the question whether organization should stop at the next smaller size unit
below the division, the brigade. These nonnuclear force structure issues
are becoming increasingly critical because they involve much more man-
power (as well as a larger share of weapons and equipment costs); and
with the end of the draft, the availability of volunteer manpower on any
reasonable pay scale may be the limiting factor on the size of the military
establishment. Also, force structure issues have the most direct political
implications, as, for example, in the question of substituting a militia-type
defense structure for many of the standing armies in the defense of
30. See A. ENTHOVEN & K. SIITH, How MuCH Is ENOUGH? 262--66 (1971).
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Western Europe. 8'
Force structure issues are seen as even more "military" than issues
of weapons development. They are not as technologically complex, but
they involve more imponderables, and there are fewer civilian analysts
competent to deal with them. It is more difficult, therefore, for civilian
authorities to understand these issues. Traditionally, force structures
were taken for granted; decisions about them were entirely within the
province of the military. If they are to be brought into the arena of
civilian reexamination and ultimate decisionmaking, the first requirement
will be to develop a body of civilian expertise sufficient to critique military
practice and to explore the implicit major premises of military proposals.
VII
If force structure issues are more "military" than issues of weapons
development, then contingency planning and actual military operations
are closest to the bone in the structure of military professionalism and
military autonomy. It was not so long ago that the Secretary of War did
not have access to the war plans of his general staff. The "war plans"
for nuclear conflict are now a subject of intense political discussion; while
nonnuclear contingency plans, particularly in Western Europe, precipitate
serious disagreements among allies. 2 The principal device for civilian
control of military operations is the promulgation of rules of engagement
-rules governing the circumstances under which forces can be committed
to military action.
In direct confrontations between nuclear powers, not only the rules
of engagement, but the details of their application as well, are determined
by civilian authorities, as in the Cuban missile crisis, or the several Berlin
crises of the fifties and sixties. Since the danger of escalation is so great,
and the application of nuclear force is recognized as involving the life or
death of civilizations, the closest control of such military operations by
civilian authorities, often directly from the White House, is assumed and
accepted. The limiting factor on civilian control is the refinement of
so-called conmmand and control technology, which enables headquarters in
WVashington to maintain rapid communication with the field, even under
quite adverse conditions, and in some cases to be able physically to control
the operation of nuclear weapons. The overseas deployment of large
numbers of so-called tactical nuclear weapons further complicates the
problem. Clearly, the danger, however limited, of an unauthorized or
31. See M. JANOWITZ, THE U.S. FORCES AND THE ZERO DRAFT 7-12 (ADELPHI PA-
PERS, No. 94) (Jan. 1973).
32. See MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, supra note 24, at 110-13.
CIVILIAN CONTROL
inadvertent nuclear exchange must be viewed in the light of the potential
disaster that would result.
United States military forces in Vietnam operated under what were
probably the tightest nonnuclear rules of engagement in United States
military history. When the rules were violated, it was as much because
of their inconsistency with the one-sided military situation, or with in-
flammatory civilian rhetoric, as because of deliberate disregard of civilian
authority. On the other hand, blinkered pursuit of conventional military
objectives consistently obstructed broader war aims in Vietnam.
The war in Southeast Asia was a tragedy initiated by civilians and
continued through civilian decision. *More effective civilian control of the
military could not have redeemed it. But as a case study in civil-military
relations, it confirms the proposition that civilian control of military opera-
tions in a modern guerrilla war (or even a quasi-guerrilla war) cannot
be maintained merely by issuing orders from civilian command. The
problems are too complex, the interplay of political and military con-
siderations too subtle. Senior military commanders need to understand
and share the objectives of their civilian superiors."
Achieving this kind of understanding is perhaps the most difficult
task for the civilian management of the military. Every bureaucracy
suffers from some form of professional distortion. President Kennedy's
frustration with the State Department bureaucracy during his adminis-
tration is well known: he characterized it as "a bowl of jelly."34 Other
characterizations might be more appropriate for the Pentagon, but its
bureaucracy can be equally frustrating-or even frightening. Military
men are trained to achieve at whatever cost the objective towards which
they are directed. " They are not trained to examine the incidental costs
of achieving those objectives. Military men work in an institution that
is remarkably effective at avoiding the gross phenomena of disorder, and
they are therefore inclined to minimize the likelihood that any of their
actions will result in gross disorder. And military men are encouraged to
compete fiercely for advancement within their own system, so that they
are somewhat less responsive to the judgments of outside observers.
Students of military sociology have pointed to a phenomenon in the
33. Samuel Huntington first drew the distinction between "objective control" of th6
military by encouraging military professionalism, with the concomitant respect for civilian
authority, and "subjective control" by instilling in the military the substantive social
philosophy of the civilian authorities. In S. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE
80-97 (1957), he expressed a preference for objective control. But he was writing in
an earlier age.
34. A. SCHLESINGER, JR., A THOUSAND DAYs 406 (1965).
35. I recall the colonel who came into my office in the Pentagon one day for an
assignment, and announced, "Just tell me what to do, sir, and then I'm all arms and legs."
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post-World War II development of the military that they call "converg-
ence" of military and civilian life styles. The modern military man is a
good deal closer to his civilian counterparts in the nature of his work and
his life style than in previous generations.3" This convergence makes
objective control of the military more difficult. It does not necessarily
make subjective control any simpler. One must avoid the easy but
dangerous assumption that greater expoure to the processes of civilian
life automatically carries with it greater understanding of the nonmilitary
aspects of United States foreign policy. A military man can be quite at
home in the institutions of civil society, and at the same time can accept
uncritically the most superficial assessments of and assumptions about
political realities that are common in that society.
Enhancing civilian control of actual military operations, then, is at
least to some extent a matter of education, and the educational process is
a life-long one. It extends from efforts to broaden the curriculum of the
military academies, and to increase the proportion of officers coming into
the services through ROTC programs, to efforts to provide greater in-
service educational opportunities in high-quality civilian institutions, par-
ticularly at the graduate level." It includes the creation of satisfactory
career lines for officers specializing in politico-military relations, and even
the possibility of lateral entry for civilian specialists into the officer ranks.
One of the ways to educate the military is to involve them more ex-
tensively in the making of national security policy, not as a by-product
of internal Pentagon decisions about weapons systems and force struc-
tures, but explicitly, as valued professional advisers on the military impli-
cations of alternative foreign policy choices. So many internal Pentagon
decisions do have foreign policy implications which military men ought
to bring to the attention of their civilian colleagues, but they cannot be
ordered to do so. They may, however, be persuaded by the same spirit
of comity that reputedly led Dean Acheson and George Marshall, as
Secretaries of State and Defense respectively, to agree that neither one
would ever say to the other: "This is a purely political issue," or, "This
is a purely military issue."3 " And if military men are taken more into the
confidence of their civilian counterparts, they are less likely to set up in-
formal information gathering networks that can proliferate with typically
single-minded military efficiency into full-fledged espionage systems.
36. See also Bidernian & Sharp, The Convergence of the Military and Civilian
Occupational Structures: Evidence from Studies of Military Retired Employment, 73
Am. J. Soc. 381 (1968) ; M. JANoWiTZ, THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER (1971).
37. See MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, supra note 24, at 73-78; but cf. id. at 222.
38. D. AcHESON, SKETCHES FROM LIFE 163 (1961).
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Mutual trust and confidence is in no sense a sufficient condition for
effective civilian control of the full range of military activities. But
mutual trust is clearly a necessary condition. Civilian control requires
presidential will and determination, congressional willingness not to in-
sist on protecting local economic interests, and extraordinary expertise
and energy in the Secretary of Defense and his staff. But it depends at
least as much on changes in attitudes towards the military in the govern--
ment and in the country: less concern about the prospects for military
interference in civilian affairs, and more concern about the need for
civilian involvement in military affairs.
